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George H. Rountree
For over a decade, the United States and the European Union (EU) have
been involved in an ongoing dispute over the importation of beef from the
United States into the EU. Because of political pressures, the EU has banned
the importation of beef from countries, such as the United States, that utilize
certain hormones in the production of cattle. This ban conflicts with an
international trade agreement to which the EU is a party. As will be shown,
it appears that the EU must either act contrary to popular political pressures or
face the consequences of violating a rule of international trade that its member
states helped create.
The ban has provided an important test case for the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) as the final arbiter of food safety disagreements. More specifi-
cally, this is the first WTO case that has involved the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and should help
define what impact that agreement will have on future trade disputes.
I. HORMONES?
Health concerns and lean meat proponents notwithstanding, consumers
demand fat beef.' This demand drives the American beef industry's produc-
tion system.
Beef with fat deposits within the muscle tissue (marbling) is more palatable
to most people than lean beef without fat deposits.' Marbling is most easily
produced by feeding grain to the growing/fattening animals.3 This fact, along
with the expertise of American farmers at producing corn (the major
J.D. 1999, University of Georgia.
See generally Everett L. Martin, Measuring Beef Quality, in THE FEEDLOT 237-57 (G.B.
Thompson & Clayton C. O'Mary eds., 1983) (explaining that one characteristic of high-grade
beef is marbling, which is present when there are fatty deposits within the meat).
2 Id. at 337.
3 See generally David P. Hutchenson & G.B. Thompson, Cattle Feeding, in THE FEEDLOT,
supra note 1, at 165-84 (explaining that grains are the primary source of energy for beef cattle
and that energy is required for the production of fat, which leads to marbling).
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component of cattle feed), led to the development of the modem cattle feeding
industry and that industry's reliance on large feed lots.4
In stark contrast to the picturesque pastoral scenes often associated with
cattle, not a blade of grass can be found in a modem feedlot. In these feedlots,
which often have capacities exceeding 100,000 animals, cattle are fed a
scientifically balanced ration that is carefully designed to provide the greatest
gain at the least cost. Because of intense competition, feedlots operate on
profit margins per animal that are often very thin or even negative.5 These thin
profit margins ensure that only the most efficient feedlots survive.
The relentless demand for feeding efficiency spawned the practice of
hormone supplementation. It was discovered that time released capsules of
bovine growth hormones (implants) placed under the skin of growing/fattening
beef cattle led to faster growth and less feed requirements per pound of beef
produced.6 These hormones were determined by the United States Department
of Agriculture to be a safe, cost effective way to increase feed efficiency and
were approved for use on animals destined for human consumption.'
When feeders began using the hormone implants and realizing the benefits
of their use, market forces dictated that other feeders also implant hormones
to remain competitive. For this reason, the use of hormone implants in
growing/fattening cattle is now an almost universal practice in American
feedlots.'
Although the degree of marbling demanded by consumers is generally not
obtainable without supplemental grain feeding, beef can be produced more
cheaply by grazing than by the feeding of grain in feedlots.9 Therefore, in
countries where consumers do not demand or cannot afford fat beef, cattle are
generally not fattened on grain but are pastured until slaughter. Hormone
implants are less economically advantageous to producers who produce
4 See generally Lennart A. Palme, Jr., hItegrating in the Feeding Industry, in THE FEEDLOT,
supra note 1, at 259, 259-63 (providing a brief history of integration and the rise of large-scale
feeding lots).
5 See generally Edward Uvacek, Jr., Economics of Feedlots and Financing, in THE
FEEDLOT, supra note 1, at 11-29 (explaining the economics of the feeding industry and how this
relates to large feed lots).
6 id.
' Id.; see also William D. Price et al., The Feedlot and the Food and Drug Administration,
in THE FEEDLOT, supra note 1, at 273-83 (outlining the Food and Drug Administration's
regulation of animal drugs).
8 See generally Price et al., supra note 7 (noting that implants are widely used in feed lots).
9 See generally ALLAN NATION, PASTURE PROFITS WITH STOCKER CATTLE (1992)
(comparing the economics of grazing and feeditig cattle).
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slaughter cattle completely on pasture without the use of grain. Thus,
hormones are utilized much less frequently in those countries.
The existence of these two different finishing systems means that both beef
produced with supplemental hormones and beefproduced without supplemen-
tal hormones are available on the world market. In a true free trade regime,
consumers would have the choice of buying beef produced with hormones,
which is more palatable because of the marbling, or beef produced without
hormones, which is cheaper because the cattle are not fed a concentrated grain
ration. Consumers in the EU do not now have such an option because the EU
has banned the importation and sale of beef for human consumption from
hormone supplemented animals. A major trade dispute between the United
States and the EU has resulted from this ban.
II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The basis of this dispute is a difference in opinion as to the relative
importance of scientific standards of food production and consumer percep-
tions of food safety. The United States believes that scientific tests should
determine safety, but the EU places more emphasis on consumer opinion.
The EU position is based on a popular distrust of meat produced with the
use of supplemental hormones.' ° This distrust arises from horror stories of
health problems from such meat. " For example, it has been reported that some
Italian infants developed opposite sex characteristics after consuming baby
food containing hormone contaminated beef products. 2 Red meat consump-
tion has dropped in European countries where illegal hormone use is present
while it has risen in countries where meat has a "clean" image, indicating the
prevalence of these consumer fears. 3 The EU points to political pressure
arising from these consumer perceptions to justify the ban, arguing that its
sovereignty permits it to decide what is and is not healthy for its citizens.
4
The United States' position is that the ban is nothing more than a trade
barrier which "promotes misinformation" and needlessly scares European
'0 See Kristen Mueller, Note, Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone Treated
Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
97, 102 (1996).
" See Werner P. Meng, The Hormone Conflict Between the EEC and the United States
Within the Context of GA 7T, II MICH. J. INT'L L. 819, 819 (1990).
12 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 102.
1 See Caroline Southey, Hormones Fuel a Meaty EU Row, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at
2.
14 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 102.
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consumers. 5 The United States points to numerous studies that have shown
hormones to pose no health risk to consumers, including studies conducted by
the EU itself, 16 the World Health Organization, 7 the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization, 8 and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.' 9
According to the United States, these hard scientific findings should determine
whether food may be banned for health reasons; subjective consumer opinion
should not be a factor.
III. ECONOMIC IMPACT
United States beef prices are lower than European beef prices. These
comparatively lower prices probably result, in part, from a greater efficiency
of the United States producers.2" Supplemental hormones contribute to this
efficiency. Traditional EU protectionism and farm subsidies have likely
contributed to the price differential as well.2 These protectionist policies are
now out of favor and most subsidies are coming to an end. As the prevalence
of subsidies decline, many European beef producers welcome the lessened
United States competition that a beef ban provides.22 Other nations such as
Argentina, where hormones do not play a very large role in beef production,
also welcome the ban and the potential it offers to capitalize on sales lost by
the United States.
In contrast, the ban has caused significant losses of revenue for American
beef producers. Estimates of losses to United States exporters range from 100
to 500 million dollars annually.23 In an attempt to eliminate these losses, the
United States has, from the very beginning, vigorously opposed the ban.
'5 European Consumers Will Buy U.S. Beef If Properly Labeled, NCA Official Says, 12
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 1030 (June 14, 1995).
16 See Meng, supra note 11, at 829.
'7 See id.
18 See EU: FAO Taking Stalking Horse Role?, REUTERTEXTLINEGROCER, July22, 1995,
at 49.
"9 See Southey, supra note 13, at 2.
20 See Charles Lister, A Sad Story Told Sadly: The Prospectsfor U.S.-EU Food Trade
Wars, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 303, 306 (1996).
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See Mueller, supra note 10, at 101.
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IV. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
In early 1981, a majority of the European Parliament favored a ban on the
administration of growth hormones to animals destined for slaughter and on
the meat from animals to which such hormones were administered.24
However, some European Economic Community (EEC) members, such as
Ireland and the United Kingdom, as well as third parties such as the United
States and the pharmaceutical industry, opposed a ban.2" In July 1981, the
Council of Ministers (Council) issued a directive prohibiting the use of two
hormones generally presumed to be harmful to humans. However, the
directive allowed individual state regulations regarding five other hormones
to remain in effect until further research was conducted.26
By 1984, this research concluded that natural hormones were safe if
administered in proper dosages but was inconclusive as to the safety of
synthetic hormones.2 ' Nevertheless, in December 1985, the Council passed a
directive based on article 43 of the EEC Treaty that generally banned the use
of hormones in slaughter animals. 28 Article 5 of this directive prohibited the
transportation of hormone treated animals between member states.29 Article
6 prohibited the importation of such animals from third-party states. 30 To
ensure compliance with article 6, meat could only be imported from states and
from processing plants that were on lists approved by the EEC. Third party
states were given until January 1, 1988, to meet the requisite conditions and
be listed.3' The United States was not listed.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) nullified the 1985 directive on
procedural grounds after a complaint was filed by the United Kingdom.32
However, in March of 1988, in accordance with proper procedure, the Council
readopted the directive in unaltered form with an effective date of January 1,
1989. 33
In 1987, in anticipation of the forthcoming ban and after bilateral
negotiations had failed to resolve the issue, the United States requested that an
24 See Meng, supra note 1I, at 820.
25 See id.
26 See Council Directive 81/602, 1981 O.J. (L 222) 32.
27 See Meng, supra note 11, at 820.
21 See Council Directive 85/649, 1985 O.J. (L 382) 228.
29 See id. art. 5.
'0 See id. art. 6.
"' See id.
32 See Meng, supra note 11, at 823.
31 See Council Directive 88/146, 1988 O.J. (L 70) 16.
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investigative committee and a panel of experts be created under the authority
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to assess the legality
of the ban. 4 The EU insisted that it had a sovereign right to determine the
extent of the health risk posed to its citizens by hormone use and resisted any
investigation.35
The United States responded to the hormone ban on January 1, 1989, with
tariffs affecting $153.5 million in products from the EU.36 These conditional
tariffs were effective only if the EU ban affected beef imports from the United
States. The United States justified its position by declaring the EU ban to be
a disguised barrier to international trade that was actionable under section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974.37 In its view, the retaliatory measures were justified
because the hormone ban was illegal under international law and because of
the EU's refusal to compromise on the issue.38
When the GATT Council convened in February of 1989, the United States
wanted a technical experts group to look into the legitimacy of the hormone
ban, while the EU wanted a dispute settlement panel to investigate the legality
of the United States' unilateral sanctions.39 The EU continued to block the
formation of a panel to investigate the legitimacy of the hormone ban. The
United States considered it inappropriate to allow the formation of a panel to
address American retaliation under section 301 when the EEC would not agree
to the United States' panel request.4°
For these reasons, the early GATT proceedings were unsuccessful in
resolving the dispute. The standoff continued with little change until 1996,
when the United States requested that the new WTO review the conflict.4'
" See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A- 1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
" See Meng, supra note 11, at 825.
36 See id.
17 See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, as amended 19 United States
C. § 2411 (Supp. VI 1988); Determination Under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 3 C.F.R.
318 (1988).
3 See Holly Hammonds, A United States Perspective on the EC Hormones Directive, II
MICH. J. INT'L L. 840, 841 (1990).
39 See id. at 841- 42.
40 See id. at 843.
41 See WTO, Completed Cases, (9)(a) European Communities - Measures affecting Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones) (visited Mar. 23, 1999) <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin
.htm>.
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V. WHAT IS THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION?
The original GATT, signed in 1947, was a provisional agreement designed
to cover the period prior to the forthcoming Havana Charter.42 One of the
primary purposes of GATT was the reduction of tariffs.43 It was tremendously
successful in that purpose, achieving a reduction in tariffs from an average of
forty percent in 1947 to 4.7 percent in 1994. 44 GATT also provided that
imports should enjoy the benefit of national treatment for internal tax and trade
regulation purposes.45
The Havana Charter was an agreement of much greater scope that provided
for an elaborate dispute settlement procedure.46 However, because the United
States never ratified the Havana Charter, it never became effective, and GATT
remained in force. 47 GATT was the forum for a number of multilevel rounds
of tariff negotiations during the 1950s and 1960s.48
The next important period for GATT, the Tokyo Round negotiations, took
place from 1974 to 1979 with the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade as the
principal objective. 49 These negotiations resulted in several specific agree-
ments known as "codes." These codes interpreted, defined or completed the
relevant provisions of the General Agreement, which was often drafted
vaguely.5" They also introduced a major inconvenience: GATT was no longer
uniform because each agreement was subject to its own dispute settlement
procedure and participation in each agreement varied, with each code having
different signatory states.5 This has been referred to as the balkanization of
42 See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GA 77. From the Havana Charter to the
World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 126 (1995).
41 See id.
44 See Joe Cobb, A Guide to the New GATT Agreement, BACKGROUNDER, May 5, 1994,
at 2.
4' See GATT, supra note 34, art. II1.
46 See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2178
(Mar. 24, 1948).
41 See John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 299-302 (1967).
4 See John B. Rehm, Developments in the Law and Institutions ofInternationalEconomics
Relations-The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403 (1968).
41 See Declaration of Ministers Adopted at Tokyo on September 14, 1973, B.I.S.D. 20
(20th Supp. 1972-73).
'o See Demaret, supra note 42, at 127-28.
5' See id. at 128.
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GATT.52 Also, the Tokyo Round was not able to remedy certain weaknesses
of GATT such as the marginal application of GATT to agricultural products.53
During the 1980s, GATT was gradually confronted with the risk of losing
the preeminent role that it played in the organization of world trade since 1947.
This occurred because GATT did not adequately address such issues as the
trade in services, intellectual property rights and agriculture. 4 The limited
scope of application of the General Agreement explains why the United States
and the EU attempted to protect certain exports by adopting unilateral
measures of retaliation for what they saw as unfair trade practices."
The growth of trading blocks such as the EEC and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) free trade area was an indication that unless the
GATT was revised, the organization of world trade would depend more and
more on bilateral relations and relations based on the relative balance of power
between a European block, a North American Block and a potential Asian
block." Such a development was not as attractive as a multilateral system to
most countries and to international businesses. The Uruguay Round of GATT,
concluded in 1994, prevented this dependence on bilateral relations from
developing and transformed GATT into the World Trade Organization.
57
The agreement that established the WTO was the high point of the Uruguay
Round. Rather than include provisions of a detailed and substantial nature, the
agreement established principles that are defined and explained in several
annexes.58 The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes is found in these annexes; it established a binding
dispute settlement procedure. 59
The agreements also applied the rules of GATT to agricultural products that
previously were outside the scope of the rules.6" The negotiations concerning
agricultural products attracted so much attention that the success of the
Uruguay Round itself depended on an agricultural agreement. 6' Despite vast
52 See John H. Jackson, What's Needed for the GATTAfter the Uruguay Round, 86 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 69 (1992).
" See Tim Josling, The GA 7T Its Historical Role and Importance to Agricultural Policy
and Trade, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE & POLICY 155-75 (Hans J.
Michelmann et al. eds., 1990).
4 See Demaret, supra note 42, at 130.
s See id. at 131.
16 See id. at 132-33.
5 See id. at 133.
5 See id.
'9 See id.
60 See id. at 139.
61 See id.
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differences between the American and the EU positions, an agreement was
reached that addressed market access, price supports, and input subsidies.62
A state wishing to become a member of the WTO must agree to all of the
multilateral agreements negotiated within the framework of the Uruguay
Round. This all or nothing approach enabled the divergence of interests
dividing certain countries to be overcome and ended GATT's balkanization.63
The establishment of a single dispute settlement procedure for the WTO added
to this coherence.
The coherence, however, is not absolute. There are four "plurilateral"
agreements annexed to the agreement setting up the WTO, one of which
relates to the bovine meat sector.64 These agreements do not bind all members
of the WTO, but only those who accept them. The new dispute settlement
procedure will be applicable to relations between the parties who have
accepted the plurilateral agreements.65
The Uruguay Round has significantly increased the role given to the rule
of law in the organization of world trade. The new provisions are more precise
and more detailed than the GATT of 1947 and the Tokyo Round agreements.
66
The importance of law in the organization of world trade is increasing simply
because of the enlargement of the areas of trade covered by the WTO as
opposed to the previous GATT. This expansion reduces the scope remaining
for unilateral action by certain states. The agreement relating to the new
dispute settlement procedure expressly provides that no member of the WTO
may take justice into its own hands in the application of multilateral agree-
ments.67 This should have the effect of limiting the use of section 301 of the
62 See Agreement on Agriculture, art. 4, in 28 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations 21807 (1994).
61 See id.
Only the title and not the text of these agreements is reproduced in the document laying
out the results of the Uruguay Round. See Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, annex 4, 33 I.L.M. 13, 27.
65 See id.
6 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, available
in 1994 WL 761483 (G.A.T.T.).
67 See Demaret, supra note 42, at 136.
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Trade Act by the United States 6 and reducing the likelihood of unilateral
action by the EU.69
These limitations reflect a loss of sovereignty by the WTO member nations.
However, such a loss is a necessary corollary to any nation's agreement to
subject itself to the jurisdiction of an international body. A failure to
recognize the loss as an inevitable circumstance at the time the treaty was
ratified is no cause for complaint at the present time. Such an argument by
either party in this dispute appears baseless on its face.
VI. SPS AGREEMENT
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are covered by the SPS agreement,
which deals particularly with agricultural products. The legitimacy of import
restrictions based on sanitary considerations has been the subject of disputes
between members of GATT.7" It is also the subject of the current beef dispute
between the United States and the EU.
Under the SPS agreement, sanitary standards must be based on scientific
principles and on international standards where such standards exist.7
Measures stricter than relevant international standards are allowed to the
extent that they are justified on a scientific basis and result from an appropriate
evaluation of the risks.72 Thus, states may set standards higher than those
generally accepted internationally but may be required to provide scientific
justification for the higher standards. The ambiguity in this provision may be
explained by the fact that some signatories did not wish to be too tightly bound
6' The United States has often used section 301 of the Trade Act to fight acts, policies, or
practices of countries that restrain trade. See Judith Bello, Section 301 of the United States
Trade Laws: Champion of Market Liberalism, in TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE UNITED STATES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 109-31 (Paul Demaret et al. eds.,
1992).
69 The EC counterpart of the United States' section 301 is the New Commercial Party
Instrument. Council Regulation No. 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1. See Marco C. E. J.
Bronckers, The Potential and Limitations of the European Community's New Trade Policy
Instrument, in TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES IN A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 68, at 133-64.
70 See Demaret, supra note 42, at 152.
71 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement, annex I A, THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 78
(1994).
72 See id.
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by a requirement of scientific justification. 73 The EU has such sentiment in the
instant case.
VII. CODEX
The standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) are
international standards as such standards are contemplated by the SPS
agreement. Codex is an international organization that develops standards for
safe food.74 These standards guide the WTO in its decisions.75
Codex has a three pronged purpose:
1) to facilitate international trade through the removal of non-tariff
trade barriers caused by differing national food standards;
2) to protect the health of consumers and ensure fair practices in the
food trade; and
3) to promote coordination of all food standards work undertaken by
international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.76
Codex standards gain their power from GATT 77 and have been adopted by the
WTO.7 ' Thus, Codex provides global standards for food safety, and its rules
currently referee food safety related disputes.79
A Codex committee deals with veterinary drugs in foods. 0 That committee
is charged with the following in relation to the acceptability of hormones in
food:
1) determine priorities for the consideration ofresidues
of veterinary drugs (including hormones) in foods, estab-
lish a list of priority drugs in foods and establish a list for
review;
71 See Demaret, supra note 42, at 152.
71 See Rodney E. Leonard, Codex at the Crossroads. Conflict on Trade, Health,
NUTRITION WEEK, July 14, 1995, at 4.
71 See id.
76 See Donna L. Malloy, The Codex Alimentarius Provides International Standardsfor
Food Production and Safety, 12 J. AGRiC. TAX'N & L. 334, 335 (1990-91).
7 See id.
78 See Leonard, supra note 74.
7 See James Walston, Codex Spells Controversy, 2 CEREs 29 (1992).
'o See Malloy, supra note 76, at 338.
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2) recommend maximum residue levels for the sub-
stances on these lists;
3) develop codes of practice as may be required; and
4) determine criteria of analytical methods used for the
control of veterinary drugs."'
If Codex standards are to determine the outcome of the beef hormone
dispute, the issue turns on whether Codex should consider only "hard
sciences," such as chemistry and biology, or should also consider so-called
"soft sciences," such as sociology and political science. Accepting soft
sciences means considering consumer views and perceptions in establishing
standards, while the hard science approach means focusing on laboratory
data. 2
Codex evaluates food based on three criteria: quality, safety, and efficacy. 3
To consider consumer perception, as the EU desires in this case, would require
the introduction of a fourth criterion that Codex has been unwilling to do. 4
This criterion would require the direct involvement of citizens and interest
groups in determining the level of risk that a society is willing to accept.8 5 It
could include such considerations as public perceptions of food safety,
economic impact, social effects, and ethics. 6 Scientific merit and study would
take second place to consumer demands and perceptions if this criterion were
adopted. 7 Therefore, the goal of reducing trade barriers would be subordi-
nated to consumer concerns and ethical considerations.88
This approach may be popular with many, but others view it as a trade
barrier in disguise. 9 This latter perspective is supported by a "social needs
test" considered by the European Parliament.90 The plan would allow the EU
to consider any impact that a particular technology might have on employment
and local industry. Such a plan would hardly leave any practical restraint on
SI See Leonard, supra note 74, at 4.
82 See id.
" See Ronald Bailey, The Fourth Hurdle, FORBES, Apr. 2, 1990, at 166.
84 See id.
8 See id.
86 See Anthony Phelps, Definition of EC's "Fourth Hurdle "Sought, FEEDSTUFFS, May 7,
1992, at 9.
87 See Leonard, supra note 74, at 4.
s See Malloy, supra note 76, at 341.
89 See generally Bailey, supra note 83, at 166 (arguing that American cattle producers lost
over $100 million in beef export sales because of restrictions on stimulants in Europe).
Id. at 166.
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barriers to trade.9' It seems that every country could come up with some social
reason to justify not accepting a particular food. For example, Muslims are
concerned that the Codex does not provide grounds for objections based on
religious beliefs. 92
At its July 1995 meeting, Codex rejected the soft science approach. It
adopted a set of recommendations that mandated a hard scientific basis for
standards in international trade.93 These recommendations were to make
Codex the "source of scientific standards for international trade." 94 At this
same meeting, Codex also set standards for residues for five growth
hormones. 95 Beef produced with these supplemental hormones, such as that
from the United States, was determined to be safe for human consumption as
long as the residues were within the limits of the standards.96
Predictably, the United States and the EU had opposite reactions to these
Codex developments. The United States secretary of agriculture commented:
"The commission's actions will benefit both consumers and producers around
the world by establishing standards on food products that are based on sound
science. '  In contrast, the EU secretary of agriculture expressed his
displeasure by commenting on the commission's secret ballot procedure. The
EU Secretary stated that "it was totally unacceptable that an international
organization should make such an important and far reaching decision in
secret, and this procedure totally contradicts the need to ensure greater
transparency in the world of Codex."9'
VIII. STRUCTURE OF THE WTO
One purpose of the WTO is to provide a "common institutional framework
for the conduct of trade relations among its Members."99 Like the proposed
but ill-fated International Trade Organization that was to be established by the
91 See id.
92 See id.
9' See Jon F. Schied, United States Wins Two of Three Codex Points, FEEDSTUFFS, July 17,
1995, at 4.
94 Id.
9' See id.
96 See Southey, supra note 13, at 2.
97 Schied, supra note 93, at 4.
98 Id.
" Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World
Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 361-65 (1995).
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Havana Charter, the WTO is a three-tiered organization comprised of the
Ministerial Conference, the General Council, and certain other Councils.'00
The Ministerial Conference is at the top of the WTO organizational chart.
It consists of representatives of all of the WTO's members. It has authority to
make any decisions necessary to fulfill the functions of the WTO. The
Ministerial Conference meets biannually and delegates authority to certain
committees to carry out the functions of the WTO agreements.'0 '
The General Council is the executive branch of the WTO and is also
composed of representatives of all members. It is responsible for the day to
day functions of the WTO. It also performs the functions of the Ministerial
Conference during the time that the latter is in recess. The various councils of
the WTO are under the authority of the General Council and operate under its
guidance. 02
The actual "work" of the WTO takes place in the various Councils that
meet when necessary to carry out their individual functions. Council
membership is open to representatives of all members. The Councils are
granted authority to create subordinate organizations and to establish rules of
procedure for themselves and their subordinates.'03
The Council responsible for the settlement of disputes between or among
the members is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB is composed
of all General Council members so a meeting of the DSB is essentially a
special meeting of the General Council. 0
IX. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
The dispute settlement procedure consists of the following stages:
consultation, panel investigation, report, appellate review, decision adoption,
and implementation. A parallel procedure for binding arbitration is also
available when all parties to a dispute agree to the procedure.'05
'0 See id. at 362.
1o1 See id.
102 See id.
'03 See id.
"o See id.
105 See id. at 368.
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A. Consultation
The consultation stage is the initial phase of the dispute resolution process.
Consultation is not simply a formality but is intended to play an important role
in the dispute settlement. 0 6 Article 3 paragraph 7 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) clearly provides that "[a] solution mutually acceptable
to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly
to be preferred" because the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to
secure a positive solution to the dispute. 107
When the complaining party requests consultations, the other party has ten
days to respond, and thereafter must enter into consultations within thirty
days.108 If the other party does neither, the complaining party may go directly
to the panel phase.' 09 If the parties do begin consultations but do not resolve
the dispute within sixty days of the request, the complaining party may request
that a panel be established."0 The thirty and sixty day time limits are
decreased to ten and twenty days respectively in urgent cases."' The time
limits may also be modified by agreement of the parties. 112
During consultations, the members in dispute are charged to make an
attempt to "obtain a satisfactory adjustment of the matter" in confidential
negotiations that, in reference to any further proceedings beyond consultations,
shall not prejudice the rights of either party." 3 The DSU specifically provides
that "[e]ach Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations
made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any
covered agreement taken within the territory of the former."'" 4
If both parties voluntarily agree, good offices, conciliation, and mediation
may be requested and may begin at any time, and the right to a subsequent
panel phase is not prejudiced.' Thus, there are four or five avenues by which
'06 See id. at381.
107 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1227 [hereinafter DSU].
See id. art. 4, para. 3.
'09 See id.
"o See id. art. 4, para. 7.
111 See id.
I12 See Dillon, supra note 99, at 381.
... DSU, supra note 107, art. 4, paras. 5, 6.
114 Id. art. 4, para. 2.
"' See id. art. 5, paras. 1, 3.
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a complaining party may reach the panel stage: consultation, good offices,
conciliation, and mediation both during or after arbitration. " 6
In the United States - EU beef dispute, the consultation phase was not
effective. Each party was convinced of the correctness of its position and was
unwilling to compromise. Therefore, the dispute moved directly to the panel
phase when the United States, on April 25, 1996, requested that a panel be
established." 7
B. Panel Investigation
The DSU provides that a panel "shall be established" following a written
request by the complaining member containing the relevant issues and a brief
summary of the legal basis of the complaint. "' Thus, a panel will be convened
in all cases unless the DSB, by consensus, decides not to form one." 9
Panels are composed of three or, if agreed to within ten days of panel
establishment, five "well qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals."'' 20 Panel nominations are made by the Secretariat, and the parties
may not oppose the nomination without "compelling reasons.'' Impartiality
is maintained by excluding the disputing parties from participating on the
panel hearing their case. 22 If the parties cannot agree to the composition of
the panel within twenty days of the order that the panel be established, the
WTO Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the
chairman of the relevant council, shall appoint a panel. 23
Panels conduct confidential deliberations, 24 set deadlines,25 receive
submissions and rebuttals, 26 and consider oral arguments. 27 Panels may
request information from any appropriate body or source, including experts,
and acquire confidential information from administrative bodies in the
116 See Dillon, supra note 99, at 382.
117 See WTO, supra note 41.
11' DSU, supra note 107, art. 6, paras. 1, 2.
119 See William E. Scanlan, Comment, A Test Case for the New World Trade Organiza-
tion's Dispute Settlement Understanding: The Japan-United States Auto Parts Dispute, 45 U.
KAN. L. REv. 591, 600 (1997).
120 DSU, supra note 107, art. 8, para. 1.
121 Id. art. 8, para. 6.
122 See id. art. 8, para. 3.
123 See id. art. 8, para. 7.
124 See id. art. 14, para. 1.
125 See id. art. 12, para. 5.
126 See id. art. 12, para. 6.
127 See id. art. 15, para. I.
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Contracting Parties' nation.' The deliberations are conducted within a
timetable set by the panel 129 and are not to exceed six months, or three months
in case of urgency. 30 Exceptions can be made to these deadlines, but the DSU
strongly disfavors proceedings that take longer than nine months.'31
Unless there is a contrary agreement by the parties, the panel will examine
the matter referred to the DSB, in light of the relevant provisions in the
agreements cited by the parties to the dispute and make such findings as will
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving rulings provided
for in those agreements. 32 Panels make the final determination as to the facts
of a case. 33 However, they do not have the last say on legal issues; that
responsibility falls on the DSB itself'
34
A panel was established to look into the United States' complaint. 35 The
dispute was investigated with the panel completing its duties and issuing a
report. 1
36
C. Report
After discovery and deliberations are complete, the panel must submit a
written report to the DSB containing its findings of fact and law, a description
of the applicability of the relevant provisions, and the basic rationale behind
its decision.'37 Before the report is submitted, there is an interim review stage
in which the panel presents its findings to the parties and receives written
comments from them in return. 13' The panel will then issue an interim report
containing its findings and conclusions. 3 9 The panel is not required to alter
its findings in any way, but the parties may require, through a written request,
that the panel address particular aspects of the interim report before it is made
12 See id. art. 13, paras. 1,2.
'29 See id. art. 14, para. 1.
130 See id. art. 12, para. 8.
"'I See id. art. 12, para 9.
132 See id. art. 7, para. 1.
13 See Dillon, supra note 99, at 383-84.
134 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 16, para. 4.
3 See WTO, supra note 41.
136 See John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, WTO Panel Decides EU-United States Dispute
Regarding Hormone in Beef, 3 INT'L L. UPDATE 87 (1997).
137 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 12, para. 7.
131 See id. art. 15, para. 1.
13 See id. art. 15, para. 2.
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final. 4 ' Once this is complete, the panel issues a final report and circulates it
to the DSB members for consideration.
14 1
Members not a party to the dispute may submit objections to the report no
later than ten days prior to the DSB meeting where the report will be
considered.142 Twenty days after the issuance of the report, members may
consider whether it should be adopted. 143 Adoption of the final report is
automatic unless a party to the dispute appeals or the DSB decides, by
consensus, not to adopt it. 44 The automatic adoption of panel reports is seen
as preferable to adoption by majority vote because the latter would leave the
dispute settlement process open to the sway of political influence.
45
The panel considering the United States - EU dispute issued a final report
on June 30, 1997.146 This report, circulated to members on August 18, 1997,
found that the ban was inconsistent with articles 3.1, 5.1, and 5.5 of the WTO's
SPS agreement, an agreement both the EU member States and the United
States are parties to.1
47
In adopting a position similar to that of the United States, the panel reached
these specific conclusions:
(1) By maintaining sanitary measures that do not rest
on a scientific "risk assessment," the EU has acted incon-
sistently with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
48
(2) When the EU adopted arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in the levels of sanitary protection it deemed
suitable in different situations, it set up a discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade. This action
does not square with the demands of SPS Article 5.5.149
(3) The EU acted at odds with the stipulations of SPS
Article 3.1 when it set up sanitary measures that are not
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. art. 16, para. 2.
141 See id. art. 16, para. 1.
144 See id. art. 16, para. 4.
141 See Miquel Montana i Mora, A GA 77 with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the
Resolution ofInternational Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 149-50 (1993).
146 See Schmertz & Meier, supra note 136, at 87.
147 See WTO, supra note 41.
141 John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, WTO Decision Holds that European Communities'
Ban on Meat froin Animals Treated with Growth Hormones Violated International Trading
Rules, 3 INT'L L. UPDATE 120, 121 (Oct. 1997).
149 See id.
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based on existing international standards and lack scien-
tific justification under Article 3.3.150
On September 24, 1997, the EU notified its intention to appeal certain
issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the panel in its decision.'5 '
D. Appellate Review
In the WTO appeals system, an appealed panel report is referred to the
"Appellate Standing Body. 1 52 This body is composed of seven persons "of
recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade,
and the subject matter of the covered agreements."' 53 Three members of this
body serve on any one case.5 4
Unlike the procedure in the panel phase, parties have no active role in
choosing Appellate Body Members. The three members of the Appellate
Body that serve on each case are selected by a rotation schedule that is created
by the body itself in consultation with the DSB Chairman and the Director-
General.' 55 However, a party is free to time its appeal, within limits, to
coincide with the present pr the next rotation. This passive manipulation of the
panel of appellate "Judges" should not cause great concern, especially in light
of the procedure whereby the Appellate Body members sitting on any
particular case are chosen by lot.'56
Appellate Body proceedings are confidential' and the opinions submitted
by the Body members are anonymous.' 8 Therefore, Appellate Body members
should not easily be "branded" as possessing any particular bias. ' This also
has a deterrent effect on passive manipulation.'6
A request for Appellate Body review is granted unless the DSB rejects it
by consensus. 6 ' Unlike most judicial systems, there is no minimum threshold
established to discourage frivolous appeals, even for the clearest violations.
150 Id.
's' See WTO, supra note 41.
152 DSU, supra note 107, art. 17, para. 1.
's' Id. art. 17, para. 3.
114 See id. art. 17, para. 2.
'55 Seeid. art. 17, paras. 1,9.
56 See Dillon, supra note 99, at 386.
117 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 17, para. 10.
... See id. art. 17, para. 11.
"" See Dillon, supra note 99, at 386.
'60 See id.
161 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 17, para. 1.
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Therefore, it seems likely that most cases will be appealed because an appeal
gives the losing party one more chance to prevail. 16 2
Because the fact finding of the Panel is final, the Appellate Body is limited
to determinations of questions of law and legal interpretation. 63  This
limitation adds weight to the view that the new dispute resolution system
creates something of a judicial tribunal."6
Parties to the dispute are required to make written submissions to the
Appellate Body. 165  No ex parte communications are allowed. 166  The
deliberations must be completed within sixty days or, if an exception is
granted in a special case, ninety days from the date of the formal request of
appeal. 167 Like panel reports, appellate reports are adopted automatically
unless rejected by consensus of the DSB within thirty days of their circulation
to members.'68
On January 15, 1998, the Appellate Body confirmed the decision of the
panel in the beef dispute. 169 The Appellate Body held that the EU beef ban
violated the SPS agreement because it was not based on a risk assessment that
included an evaluation of the potential adverse impact of hormone residues on
human health.17
0
However, the Appellate Body also pointed out that WTO members have a
right to levels of protection that are higher than prevailing international
standards, such as the Codex, in matters relating to human health. 17' But
higher levels of protection are allowed only when there is appropriate
scientific justification. 172  The Appellate Body agreed with the panel's
conclusion that the EU had not shown sufficient scientific justification for its
ban on the import of hormone treated beef. However, it reversed the panel
finding by concluding that the right to go beyond international standards is an
important and autonomous right of governments and not merely an exception
162 See Dillon, supra note 99, at 385.
163 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 17, para. 6.
" See Dillon, supra note 99, at 385.
161 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 17, para. 4.
166 See id. art. 17, para. 1.
167 See id. art. 17, para. 5.
16s See id. art. 17, para. 14.
169 See Gary G. Yerkey & Peter Menyasz, United States Applauds WTO Ruling Upholding
Earlier One Against EU Ban on Beefhinports, 15 INT'L LEGAL REP. 77, 77 (Jan. 21, 1998).
171 See Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, United States Opposes New Risk Assessment in
Dispute with EU Over Beef Horniones, 15 INTI'L LEGAL REP. 76, 76 (Jan. 21, 1998).
171 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Decision on EU Beef Imports to Have Impact Beyond
Hormones, 15 INT'L LEGAL REP. 142 (Jan. 28, 1998).
172 See id.
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to the general SPS obligation to base measures on prevailing international
norms.' 73 The Appellate Body declared: "We do not believe that a risk
assessment has to come to a monolithic conclusion that coincides with the
scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS measure.' 1
74
The EU contended that declaration permits it to disregard Codex and other
international standards and justify the ban by its own assessment of the risks.'T7
On January 16, 1998, the EU announced that it would perform a new scientific
assessment and would not be importing hormone treated beef any time soon. 76
The United States interpreted the decision to mean a ban can be based on
scientific views that do not represent the views of the majority of scientists but
can only be imposed where the risk involved is life threatening and perceived
to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety.'"
According to an American official, "The problem here is that there is no basis
for being more stringent than the Codex standards."' I7
Another key panel finding overturned by the Appellate Body concerned the
scope of risk assessments used to justify controls on food imports for health
and safety reasons. According to the panel, such an assessment should be
limited to factors that can be subject to quantitative analysis by empirical or
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the physical
sciences. However, the Appellate Body concluded that risk assessments could
cover not only factors ascertainable in a scientific laboratory operating under
strictly controlled conditions, but also risks in human societies as they actually
exist; in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health
in the real world where people live, work, and die. 79
The EU pointed to this language as justification for its claim that factors
such as a potential for improper use of hormones by farmers are proper for
consideration when making a risk assessment." 0 The United States replied
that less restrictive methods, such as better residue tests, could be used rather
than an outright ban on hormones.'
173 See id.
174 Id.
175 See Yerkey & Pruzin, supra note 170, at 77.
176 See Steven Cahn, Wide Interpretation Follows WTO Ruling on EU Ban on Hormone-
Treated Beef, Vol. 39 No. 49 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, available in 1998 WL 10981738.
177 See Yerkey & Pruzin, supra note 170, at 76.
171 Id. at 77.
179 See id.
'so See id.
"'l See id. at 76.
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The Appellate Body ruled that the EU beef ban was illegal as it stood.
However, its position as to the EU meeting the requirements of the SPS
agreement with a future risk assessment was less clear. In answering one
question, the Appellate Body created other questions to which it gave no clear
answer.
E. Decision Adoption
Like panel decisions, Appellate Body decisions are automatically adopted
unless rejected by consensus of the DSB.8 2 The ruling is circulated to the
members and submitted to the DSB for action at its next meeting.183
When the DSB convened at the February 13, 1998 meeting of the WTO, it
adopted both the Panel Report and the Appellate Body Decision.' 84 Under
WTO rules, the EU had thirty days from the adoption of these reports to
disclose how it planned to implement the ruling. 85
After the decision was adopted, the United States wanted the EU to strictly
comply with the Appellate Body ruling and lift the ban within a reasonable
amount of time. 8 6 The American trade representative wanted the ban "lifted
quickly," and was not interested in receiving compensation or retaliatory tariff
reductions on other products. 87 He believed that a reasonable length of time
could be up to fifteen months.'88
However, the EU saw the situation differently. On March 13, 1998, the EU
announced that it would carry out new studies on the risks of hormone treated
beef while maintaining its import ban. 189 In a written statement, the EU
responded that it would look into how to carry out its "international
obligations," while conducting a new risk assessment. 190 It claimed the ruling
allowed it to keep the ban in place while it reassessed the risks of hormones.' 9'
The Office of the United States Trade Representative responded that the
EU was misreading the WTO ruling by concluding that it could satisfy its
'82 See supra Part IX. D.
183 See Yerkey & Pruzin, supra note 170, at 76.
'84 See WTOAdopts Reports on EUHormone- Treated Beef Case, AGENCEFRANCE-PRESSE,
Feb. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2221739.
185 See id.
'86 See Yerkey & Menyasz, supra note 169, at 77.
187 Id.
"'8 See id.
189 See EU to Keep Hormone-Treated Beef Embargo While Carrying Out New Risk Study,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2241195.
190 Yerkey & Pruzin, supra note 170, at 76.
91 See id.
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obligations under the SPS agreement by conducting another risk assessment.' 92
A representative from that office said that the use of the reasonable amount of
time to conduct a new risk assessment without lifting the ban would be an
inappropriate use of that time.'93 The representative pointed out that every risk
assessment undertaken to date has shown that growth-promoting hormones in
cattle pose no risk to human health. 194 This statement was made only one week
after the release of a UN report that found no food safety or health concerns
with hormone-treated beef.'9
The spokesperson for the Canadian beef industry, which is also affected by
the EU ban, was even more critical of the decision than the American
spokesperson. The Canadian opinion was that the decision offered the EU a
further opportunity to prove that a ban on hormone-treated beef is justified for
health protective reasons. 196 The Canadians believed that the opinion gave the
EU enough flexibility to ensure that Canadian beef would continue to be
banned from the European market. The spokesperson commented that there
was no "reason to think Europe [will] be any more amenable than they have
been in the past."' 97
F. Arbitration
If a member is found to be in violation of a WTO rule, the member is
required to bring the measure into conformity with the relevant agreement
within a reasonable amount of time proposed by the member in violation.'98
Where such a time period has not been approved by the DSB, a period of time
is agreed to by the parties to the dispute. Where no agreement is reached
within forty-five days of the adoption of the report or decision, the period of
time will be determined by binding arbitration within ninety days of the
adoption of the report.' 99
Not surprisingly, the United States and the EU could not agree on the
amount of time required to implement the decision. The EU claimed that it
needed up to four years to carry out a new scientific assessment, but the United
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
' See New UN Report Says Milk, Meat from Hormone- Treated Cows is Safe, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6643980.
916 See Yerkey & Menyasz, supra note 169, at 77.
197 Id.
98 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 21, para. 3(a).
'99 See id. art. 21, para. 3(c).
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States wanted compliance within ten months.200  Therefore, the WTO
appointed two arbitrators to decide the details of the implementation period. 20'
Before the decision was reached, one of the arbitrators stepped down because
his position was considered by the WTO to be too close to the United States'
202position.
The remaining arbitrator announced his decision on May 29, 1998: the EU
must comply with the Appellate Body decision by May 13, 1999.203 This date
was fifteen months after the date of the Appellate Body decision.2' The
arbitrator ruled that the EU could not wait to begin steps to change its
legislation governing the ban until it had carried out a new scientific study.20 5
This seemed to indicate that the only way for the EU to comply with the ruling
would be to lift the ban.
However, the EU responded that it would still carry out a scientific
assessment of the risks of hormones; the results could be ready by the May 13
deadline, but there were no guarantees.20 6 By June 5, 1998, the EU had
confirmed that fourteen scientists were working on new risk assessment
analyses.20 7 Although some of these studies would not be completed before the
deadline, the EU hoped to have a "clear view on the risk assessment" by the
beginning of 1999.201
G. Noncompliance
If the Member in violation fails to comply with the reasonable amount of
time, the complaining party may call for negotiations for compensation; this
payment is voluntary on the part of the Member in violation.20 9
Where no compensation is agreed to within twenty days after the expiration
of the reasonable amount of time, the complaining party may request that the
200 See WTO Names Arbitrators in Hormone Dispute Case, AGRA EUR., May 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 10844728.
201 See id.
202 See EU Needs 15 Months for Hormone Assessment, AGRA EUR., May 15, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 10844770.
203 See Ruling on EU Hormone Ban Compliance, AGRA EUR., May 29, 1998, available in
1998 WL 10844847.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See EU Launches Hormone Risk Assessment Studies, AGRA EUR., June 5, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 10844934.
208 Id.
209 See DSU, supra note 107, art. 22, para. I.
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DSB authorize retaliation through suspension of the claimant's concessions or
other obligations of the member in violation.21 At first retaliation is limited
to the same sector and agreement. With respect to goods, "sector" is defined
as "all goods."21'
If the complaining party believes such retaliation would be insufficient, it
may retaliate across sectors and agreements. 2 Cross retaliation is subject to
a more stringent procedure. Where a respondent believes that the complainant
seeking cross retaliation is in violation of article 22 of the DSU, the respondent
may request arbitration to determine whether any retaliatory measures are
appropriate.2t 3
Although the Republican-controlled United States Congress and the Clinton
White House rarely agree, in October 1998, both agreed to retaliate against the
EU if its beef import rules were not in compliance with the WTO ruling by
May 13, 1999.214 More important, in January 1999, President Clinton revived
the expired "Super 301," a controversial trade weapon that allows the United
States Trade Representative to impose unilateral sanctions against other
countries for unfair trade practices that affect United States exports. 2 5
Initially, retaliation would probably be limited to foodstuffs but could
expand to encompass other areas of trade. The EU will probably exercise its
right to arbitration to determine if any retaliatory measures are appropriate.
The wide range of possible retaliatory measures allowed by the DSU gives
"teeth" to international trade disputes resolutions.2"6 The possibility of
measures extending to a contracting party's activity in a nondisputed
agreement means that contracting parties cannot choose which agreements to
follow and which to violate.21 7 The DSU provides that the retaliatory measures
must be "practicable or effective" in resolving disputes."'
Thus, the notion that it may be more advantageous to receive a penalty than
to comply with the decision should prove to be unfounded. According to the
210 See id. art. 22, para. 2.
2. Id. art. 22, para. 3(0(i).
112 See id. art. 22, para. 3(b).
213 See id.
214 See Marc Sellinger, Clinton Averts Vote on EU Trade, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at
B9.
215 See United States Revives Feared Trade Weapon Amid Rows with Top Trade Partners,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 27, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2536047.
216 See Azar M. Khansari, Note, Searchingfor the Perfect Solution: International Dispute
Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 183,
194 (1996).
237 See id. at 194-95.
21" DSU, supra note 107, art. 22, para. 3.
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new rules, "the penalty imposed for violating one agreement could be a
suspension from another agreement, if such a suspension would be more
effective., 2 '9 The heart of any dispute resolution mechanism is the deterrent
value of its penalties. By having the Appellate Body determine whether
penalties are practicable or effective, the DSU attempts to instill penalties that
deter future violations.220
The EU neither lifted the ban by the May 13 deadline nor provided
scientific evidence that the banned beef was hazardous.22' Consequently, the
United States requested that the WTO impose sanctions on certain European
agricultural products.2  On June 3, 1999, the WTO approved the request for
sanctions and appointed an arbitration panel to determine the amount due.223
The panel approved 100% sanctions on 116.8 million dollars in damages for
the United States.224
H. Compromise?
To say the least, this dispute has not been a model of effective negotiation
and compromise. In October 1998, months after the decision of the arbitrator
was announced, EU farm ministers expressed the opinion that it would be
premature to prepare a response to the WTO before the results of the new risk
assessments were in. At the same time, those ministers announced that the
results would likely not be in by the May 13, 1999, deadline. 225 By February
1999, it had become clear to the EU that it would not have firm evidence that
beef produced with hormones represented a risk to human health by the May
deadline.226
With the deadline drawing near and the United States preparing trade
sanctions against the EU, the EU began to consider its options. It decided that
the two best proposals were: 1) maintain the ban and pay compensation to the
219 Khansari, supra note 216, at 195.
220 See id.
221 See Janelle Carter, US Ainis to Punish EU in Beef Spat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 14,
1999, available in 1999 WL 17803632.
222 See id.
223 See Clare Nullis, WTO Approves EUBeefSanctions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17810182.
224 See Naomi Koppel, US, Canada Get $124 M in Sanctions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 13,
1999, available in 1999 WL 17823629.
225 SeeEU "WillMiss" WTO BeefHormone Deadline, AGRA EUR., Oct. 23, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 23502003.
226 See EU and US Headfor New Trade Showdown Over Hormones, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Feb. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2543311.
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United States and Canada; and 2) lift the ban on the condition that beef
produced with hormones would be clearly labeled as such.227 With these
options in mind, the EU adopted a plan to negotiate an interim solution with
the United States. The interim plan is to end when the results of the risk
assessments are available.2
Although the EU's willingness to negotiate indicated that it would not be
fully complying with the WTO ruling, the United States saw it as a positive
development.2 29 The United States stated that if the EU chose to make a
proposal for compensation, the United States would follow the WTO rules.230
In reply to the labeling proposal, the United States offered to label all beef
exported to the EU as American produced. The United States said it was
prepared to affix labels such as "USDA Choice," "USDA Prime," and "USDA
approved beef., 231' The United States proposal was not acceptable to the EU,
which insisted that the beef be labeled as produced with hormones.232
After the WTO approved trade sanctions against the EU on July 12, 1999,
the United States expressed its continuing desire for a negotiated solution
involving some form of labeling. 233 However, the relatively low value of the
approved sanctions may have reduced Europe's incentive to deal.
X. IMPLICATIONS
To the extent that DSU decisions are expected to resolve disputes, a United
States - EU compromise would be a success for the fledgling WTO. However,
the credibility of the DSU may be weakened if the EU prevails in maintaining
its ban after the ban is found to violate trade rules. This may or may not be a
bad thing, depending on one's view of the role that the WTO should play in
this regard.
The strength of the SPS agreement is also in question. While this decision
affirmed the position that sanitary measures must be based on scientific
227 See EU to Consider Lifting Ban on Beef Hormones, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 10,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2543974.
221 See Elizabeth De Bony, EUActstoAvert Trade War Over Beef Hormones, J. COM., Feb.
11, 1999, at Abstracts IA.
229 See id.
230 See EU Still Mulling Options in United States Hormone Beef Dispute, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Feb. 17, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2548149.
23 United States Plan Fails to Ease Beef Dispute; Europeans Still Want American Meat
Labeled as Hormone-Treated, BALT. SuN, Feb. 16, 1999, at 8C.
232 See id.
233 See id.; US Willing to Negotiate with EU in Beef Horinone Row, Despite WTO Ruling,
AFX NEWS, July 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21851934.
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standards, it clouded the water as to what constitutes a scientific standard. If
member states are allowed to define "scientific" in each case, the SPS
agreement will be a hollow gauge.
The EU interpretation of the decision could be used to justify more
stringent food safety standards in other areas, so long as the measures were
backed by something fitting the proponent's definition of science. Such
standards could conceivably be used to restrict genetically modified foods or
veterinary controls.234
The WTO is likely to address the issue of whether to revise the SPS
agreement in the new round of agriculture negotiations scheduled for 1999.
The outcome of this dispute could be an important factor in whether or how
the agreement is revised.235
There is the distinct possibility that the ban will continue, even if it is not
legally justified. In such a case, the United States can only resort to retaliatory
sanctions. As this is written, sanctions appear imminent. This will not be a
pleasant outcome for either side; both consumers and industries that use the
sanctioned products will be affected. Generally, everyone loses when
retaliatory measures are taken. That is why retaliation is, and is likely to
remain, the exception rather than the rule.236 It is also a factor that may tend
to weaken the force of DSU decisions to the extent that the prevailing party is
reluctant to initiate sanctions.
The basic point is simple: both the EU and the United States are important
customers of the other. Each can benefit only if both search for ways to
accommodate their different interests. Regardless of the perceived role of the
DSU, no dispute is likely to be settled unless the parties want it settled.
234 See Pruzin, supra note 171, at 142.
235 See Bello, supra note 68.
236 See id.
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